

Model III

Allison: Without McN, Bremer & RFK,
there would have been an air strike;
With an air strike, "I felt the world
had been a 30% chance of nuclear war."
"I've never heard an estimate of less than
10% — from anyone who has seriously
studied the problem."

Chsr: "!" DE: "!"

12/10/68
Lynn & Mike

13
Oct 30

McN reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 inconclusive.

R: Castro adamant re. inspection. Pres conf. postponed.

Pres: recon be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 8 PM

R: unsatisfactory talks between OT and Castro.

tomorrow:

Pres: a) No U-2 flights

b) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as OV provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

Draft on Nuclear-free zones (25 Oct? revised 26)

Turky must be included in ME. one free zone.

Turky have to withdraw weapons from Turkey
to reduce potential of Cuban intervention.

437: 10 AM Oct 27

McN recommended, Pres approved, 2 daylight runs today:
1 morning and 1 this afternoon [undertaken?] Again
recommended night run Tonight. In response to Russia's
request for delay of this mission, Pres said never planned that
go on alert, - final decision this afternoon.

Agreed Russians would be informed of start of
gunnery zone privately. To call the decide whether to
turn back low under Braggs, which will ^{be} returning gunnery
zone later today. If Braggs countered, a decision could then be
made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to

should be

Harmon or within its shipper, received, I believe,
if as reported, it had on board as printed material.
A decision would also be required as to what action should
be taken if the tank refused to submit to search.

4. At this point in the meeting the printed text of the
new public statement was received. It became clear
that the text of the public statement varied considerably
from the proposals made by C in his personal letter to
the PWS last night. The proposed release of public statement,
which was drafted during the meeting, a second and
longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later
abandoned).

Draft message to C was discussed at a final session
will be completed for trans. this afternoon.

Decision to drop draft to C deferred.

#8, typed

10, 11AM Oct 28

1. Full TASS text read

2. McNaughton strategy was study still and no other
relationships would be entered guarantee for today

3. Pres directed no air mission be flown today, no
action be taken against B-52 ships today, but every
effort made to get UV to fly recon mission Monday.

Classified info ~~intended~~ released to UN ^{offends}
so as to facilitate inspection tests.

Pres approved public statement indicating his decision to
withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. He agreed that
we should read offensive weapons to include bombers, but
should not get hung up on this issue.

[Minutes essentially for action purposes?]

Pres directed letter to be drafted.

13

Oct 30

McN reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 inconclusive.

R: Castro adamant re. inspection. Pres. conf. postponed.

Pres: recon be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 6 PM

R: unsatisfactory talks between OT and Castro.

tomorrow:

Pres: 2) No U-2 flights

3) Up to 4 low-level sorties, but no plane would risk more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as OV provided a satisfactory substitute. Pres added this should be a matter

of priority with us because, if a US plane is shot down, we may have to take retaliatory measures.

What did Debts think of ("O": being)
rest of foreign etc?
and if it occurred?

But Debts was not necessary to
JFK's ultimate (unless, it was
(for JFK!) - or the time he offered.

It could ("should," according
to Debts, and most "national sector
analysts") have come from coercion,
or from "calm appraisal of

balance of forces." Or as it did: for a
combination of fear and fear-of-failure, stubbornness, drill, etc.
Likewise for K, if he was

a "calm national sector"; but Debts
pushed, and may (had) have
been necessary.

i.e. bureaucratically,
giving "normal
moderates"

(JFK allowed "normal workers"
to antagonize his "elite
and from + upholders"
on last night - thus far won.

What makes K backward fragile & prohibitive
to changes (it is not, for Debts!)

is 1) His unreal: McG B, McN (Bell?) (cont?)

2) His "toughness" till then. ("admirable; normal; predictable
Balashik")

3) He didn't back down - despite this force;
he won't a command; why did he?

4) His bully is SO control (of SLMs),
and conditional
AA (?) + minister; so why the
resist (he had 43 hours; could
have "used" all day Sunday...)
(Why did he survive so soon? is chicken

→ 5) His knowledge of this deceit/bureaucratic (deceit of) utilizing to back
down; bullying to back

- ✓ Does B think it inevitable, certain, that K will back down? see 235
- ✓ Does in fact RFK's ult. add the nothing
- || Does in fact US add still to the prob/risk that US could strike (by Monday!) if K did not desist the wishes? ("statement of fact": i.e. ^(that) did not change situation, US prob. ("expression of it" ^{very clear}) combined it for combined it for

Otherwise, he should recognise (not "say")
that JFK's initial response to beer was
the warmer conditional part of US strike (= war)
if K did not move within 24⁴⁸ hours
(which JFK did not, much, expect!)

RFK did not say: "We can (probably) not hold back SCS more than 48 hours, although we will ~~try~~ ~~try~~ our hardest."

Nor did he believe (what he said) that there could not be a deal along the lines of a public treaty.

(Why is ref. to a conf deleted?!

— fat.

27 Oct: No evidence of ~~gross~~ intent to salt construction.

35 sites open, 6th by 28 Oct

Plates of 25 Oct. confirm the presence of Phossy
tanks, arranged radially in a compass.

il 0-2 were extra reported elsewhere.

(when?) then missing & present down. Glass Plans written
unknown, whether loss had resulted from hostile action.

Subsequent Cuban reports of recovery of wreckage & pilot body established location, but Castro never explicitly acknowledged shooting down.

ICS recommended an strike no later than 29 Oct
unless irrefutable evidence of dismantling obtained in
meantime.

Loss of U-2 discerned by TS with SecDef in light
of action decided on 23 Oct in event of such happening.

(inform Pres. through SAC/DOJ; demands immediate ^{prob.} arrest against the likely S.M., and prob. continue 0-2).

In view of absence of any facts regarding cause of loss, decided not to take any action pending receipt of more info.

...Sovs probably would not use US intervention as excuse for immediately overrunning Berlin but Sovs ^{should} take advantage of situation, initiate pressures ^{step by step} & probes, consisting of heavily increased propaganda, harassment, recognition of East Germany, and closing of access routes through East German agency.

[Shows, in effect, 3/25 to 4/20. like Thompson?]

X

24 Sept. 5 to Ritterman

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24 Sept. (as of 10 day) Cuban pilot training in IL-28.

25. Above story questionable ^{to CMC}: how come comment, since no Spanish word. initial message this subject had major impact since and DIA does not want to add to confusion until basic message clarified.

26. Sept. report based on Spanish account in Russian. Spanish transmission error omitted a "no" at beginning of sentence, "Spanish terminology" was noted.

28 Oct 0900-1900 JCS meeting:

In view of recent intel on low coop in
area, request recommendation from CINCPAC on any
changes necessary in the planning, particularly whether
Division forces should be equipped with the new

CANT implied a constraint in its present that US air
ground forces committed for Code Name in Tonkin
delivered coop. So JCS authorized him to take
nuclear capable delivery systems (e.g., B-52, Honest John)
but no new weapons themselves without further JCS approval.

Pettibone to schedule 4 low-level recon flights
for late afternoon, & that aircraft would fly through
any fire encountered. (?) (disapproved? no flights)

Draw attention of CINCPAC to latest K message, which
JCS thought might be an insincere proposal intended
to gain time.

Again considered loss of U-2; no action.

Govs probably would not make it's intention an
excuse for immediately intervening. Berlin but Govs
would take advantage of situation, include pressures
of U.S. 1st
& friends, consisting of demands, increased propaganda,
demonstrations, recognition of East Germany, and closing of
access routes through East German agency.

{ Shows, in effect, USSR & U.S. like Thompson? }

X

24 Sept. 15 to Ritterman

1st in

as in

24 Sept. (as of 10 May) Cuban pilots training in IL-28s

25. Above stay questionable ^{0 CIC}; how come comment, since no Spanish
word... initial message this subjects had major impact here
and DCA does not want to add to confusion until basic
message clarified.

26. 9th report based on Spanish accents in Russian. Apparent transmission
error omitted a 'no' at beginning of sentence, "Spanish
terminology was noted"

Lat:

27 Oct: No evidence of documents to date construction:

55 sites open, with by 28 Oct

Plates of 25 Oct confirmed presence of Phases,
targets, command and relay, in a camp.
U-2 was later reported missing,
(when?) then missing & found down. Plane's location
unknown, whether loss due resultant from hostile action.

Subsequent Cuban aspects of recovery of wreckage & pilot
body established location, but Castro never explicitly
acknowledged shooting down.

JCS recommended an strike no later than 29 Oct
without identifiable evidence of downing obtained in
meantime.

Loss of U-2 measured by JCS with SecDef in light
of action decided on 27 Oct in event of such happening
pends.
Inform Pres. through SAC/DCI/Chairman of Command
most
total against the likely U-2, and probable outcome (U-2).

In view of absence of any info regarding cause of loss, decided
no action pending receipt of more info.